DAVID GOULD, School of Fine Art, History of Art and Cultural Studies, University of Leeds
‘Reflection on natural beauty is irrevocably requisite to the theory of art.’
Nature is very often considered to be that which has not been modified through human activity. By extension, natural beauty emanates from the unblemished corners and cracks of the world. This image, however, is pure fiction: nature does not exist. This essay will show that the paradox of our present moment is that human activity is necessary in the revival of nature, and therefore, in the revival of natural beauty. I will begin the essay by looking at how Hegel understands two predominant ways of relating to nature. I will then bring the two together through an examination of the structure of what Hegel terms the ‘Notion.’ The Notion is crucial in understanding Hegel’s position on natural beauty. Once I have established my reading of the Notion I will look more closely at the Notion of nature, and then natural beauty. I will then move onto Adorno’s critique of Hegel. I will show how Adorno condemns Hegel as a ‘philosopher of identity’ who extinguishes any trace of natural beauty. Once I have shown Adorno’s critique I will detail his own understanding of natural beauty as that which always escapes conceptual determination. The purpose of this is at first to show another reading of Hegel but also to show how both Hegel and Adorno return to art in their thinking on natural beauty. They do so, however, for very different reasons. To conclude I will show how Adorno missed the subversive potential of the Notion in Hegel’s thinking. Adorno’s suspicion of self-consciousness led him to create a philosophy that actually undermines his own project. I want to show how Adorno’s commitment to non-identity, and his thinking on natural beauty, can only be fully realised if we return to Hegel and the Notion. What this means for natural beauty will, I think, demand a thorough reconsideration of the relationship between art and nature.
Hegel and Natural Beauty
Hegel rightly tells us in Philosophy of Nature that the question ‘what is nature?’ can always be asked but never answered completely. The question arises when we observe the workings of nature and wish to grasp its eternal, simple essence. Hegel identifies two predominant ways of relating to nature. Although the two ways of relating to nature are examined separately, in practice they are inextricably linked. The first way is via a practical relationship and the other is via the study of physics (by physics I take Hegel to mean the physical sciences in general and throughout this essay I will use the word physics in this sense). The practical relationship between Man and nature is one in which nature is treated as merely a means to satisfy the needs of Man. For this relationship to function, nature is laid out before Man as an externalised world. The practical relationship is only concerned with particular objects of this external world. The universal aspect of nature is not considered, for example, in the transformation of trees into houses. In an encounter with nature, Man uses nature against itself. The relationship between Man and nature is thus a relationship between Man’s appetite and the world brought into being through that appetite: ‘our purpose overrides the objects of nature, so that they become means, the determination of which lies not in themselves but in us.’
Physics, on the other hand, is a relationship with nature in which Man seeks to know the universal aspect of nature. By attempting to discover natural laws, physics goes beyond the immediacy of the practical relationship. Not only is physics interested in the fact that trees can be used to build houses, but also what natural laws determine the strength and malleability of trees. What physics misses, however, is that thought transforms objects. Even through a vast taxonomy of species, no two trees are identical. In this way we can say that ‘trees’ as such do not exist without being formed by Man’s conceptual apparatus. The particulars that render two similar but non-identical objects to be different are ignored in the final move towards the creation of a universal law: ‘we turn things into universals or make them our own, yet as natural things they should be free for themselves.’ Physics cannot account for the role that thinking plays in the constitution of natural laws. Physics is not wrong, but merely incomplete.
The link between the two approaches is that nature is posited as external to thought. Even the physical body of Man is seen as an externality. The role of philosophy should be to relate to nature in a way that can account for the role of thinking as a constitutional force. Through the modes of thinking highlighted above, nature is simultaneously reduced to the functionality of its particulars and understood through the universalisation of those particulars by the application of laws. Because the subject is also an object, objects penetrate thought somatically, through sensuousness. However, in the process of penetrating thought, thinking removes the particulars of an object in order to equate it with a classification of other similar objects. No matter how nature is thought of, it must be taken as the result of the separation of thought from nature. An attempt to place thought as such back into nature, an attempt to mix the two together as two separate elements, falls short of achieving a complete synthesis because the division between the two is maintained.
The Notion of nature goes beyond this limitation by maintaining the particulars of each object in their own self-movement while also allowing objects to maintain their inner necessity as objects. The divisions drawn up in nature by thought and the rules created to explain the relationship between the divided parts are brought back together, not by turning away from thinking, but through philosophy. The Notion allows the particulars of an object that are removed by the imposition of law to emerge on their own terms. But, because the Notion is still a product of thought, even if thought coincides with the object, it can still develop one-sidedly. The Notion is sustained through thinking as an activity that is neither a passive recipient of sense data, nor the imposition of law. Thinking must reach beyond pre-given categories, must reach beyond thought to that which is not thought. This paradox, this impossibility, is what drives philosophy. This allows a way into a discussion of Beauty.
Hegel characterises Beauty as the pure appearance of absolute truth (the Idea) to the senses. Appearance, though, does not imply a kind of falsity. As mentioned above, our conceptual mediation of the world is not a one-way relationship: ‘there is some reality which, instead of having its being immediately in itself, is posited negatively in its outer existence at the same time.’ We are also not just minds, and despite the alienation between mind and body, our encounters with the world are mediated through both thought and feeling. Our feelings are not purely sensuous and our concepts are not the result of pure thinking. Appearance is the sensuous encounter with the world mediated through concepts. And just as our understanding of the world is merely a partial understanding when taken from either a subjective or objective view, so too does appearance manifest in a partial state. Pure appearance, Beauty, emerges through the Notion. Beauty is the encounter with the Notional freedom granted to an object, or to be more specific, the freedom an object grants to itself beyond subjective determination.
So what of natural beauty? The concept of freedom mentioned above is extremely important at this point. The freedom that objects gain through the Notion does not appear in thought arbitrarily. Freedom arises in thought but, like the laws of physics, is a part of the world. And like other concepts, freedom remains partially fulfilled until the Notion ruptures the divisions between subject and object. Freedom is, then, an integral part of Hegel’s thinking of natural beauty. To explain this, Hegel separates nature into animate and inanimate categories. Inanimate nature is, in short, lifeless: rocks, metals, minerals, etc. If one were to divide a lump of gold, for example, into equal parts, each part would be merely a division of the same material. The interaction between each part is a mere regularity, a conformity to a rule. Organic nature, on the other hand, is extremely complicated. A living organism is the embodiment of several distinct parts working together. The complexity and difference of each part goes beyond mere regularity and conforms to law. Conformity to law is the essential quality that settles differences in their unity. An animal, as a unity of different parts (organs, connective tissue, muscles, etc.), acts as an individual in its day to day activity. Yet despite this activity it remains bound by law to its species. Although determined by its species, an animal appears to engage in self–movement. Any movement found in inanimate nature is only granted through an interaction with other external objects. But the movement endowed to animals is limited to the kind that parallels the practical relationship to nature. Animals cannot go beyond a freedom delimited by the drive to act for itself. And here is where Hegel observes an obvious lack.
Since Hegel posits freedom as a crucial standard of assessment for beauty, natural beauty clearly lacks the freedom expressed via self-consciousness. Natural beauty is perceived, and despite the activity required to maintain the Notion of nature, there clearly remains a demarcation between self-consciousness and nature. But, to be clear, the release of nature back into itself is not the same as the observation of nature from the outside. Rather, the release of nature is the dissolution of the law that renders nature to be an immutable externality. Self-consciousness is not an abstract, ephemeral entity in which the sensuous receives external stimulus and thought demarcates reality. Self-consciousness expresses itself through, amongst other things, art. Such expressions are not found in nature because animal life, the ‘summit’ of natural beauty, is governed solely by the drive for self-preservation. In short, Hegel finds natural beauty lacking due the absence of human activity, or to be more specific, natural beauty is lacking the freedom that can only be expressed through art. Due to the lack of self-consciousness in nature, Man creates art in order to realise Beauty fully.
Extinguishing all traces of natural beauty
Where Hegel thinks that natural beauty lacks what only self-consciousness can express, Adorno thinks that this lack itself is what constitutes natural beauty. The central issue that Adorno has with Hegel’s thinking on natural beauty, and Hegel’s philosophy as a whole, is that he understands Hegel to be a ‘philosopher of identity’. By this, Adorno claims that Hegel’s dialectic is a system which culminates in the total reconciliation between subject and object, between Man and nature. Adorno argues that the subject in Hegel’s philosophy possesses the power to encompass the Absolute, a moment when thinking thinks itself. He referred to this aspect of Hegel’s philosophy as ‘belly turned mind,’ a mind that claims that it is able to consume (to understand) the world in its entirety. The reconciliation between subject and object is done on the terms governed by the subject. The superiority of the epistemic subject in Hegel’s philosophy means that Man ultimately dominates nature. In the Notion of nature described earlier, freedom remains mere appearance. When the subject thinks that the object has been set free through thought as active negation, the subject in fact grips onto the object even tighter. Nature is released back into a world created by the subject. Natural beauty veils itself at the moment of greatest proximity to truth. No matter how much Hegel insists that the Notion can reconcile both the mediated and immediate relationship between subject and object, the Notion is essentially the reaffirmation of the cognitive powers of the subject, a redoubling of the domination of nature, because thought dictates the terms of the reconciliation. Self-consciousness releases a part of itself only as a means of subsuming even more of the world.
For Adorno, the reason that Hegel’s philosophy encounters this problem is because of the self-affirmatory character of self-consciousness. The condition that is minimally required for self-consciousness is that the strictly autonomous self-relation cannot be determined by anything else while simultaneously determining itself against that which it is not. The very character of self-consciousness, that which Hegel sees as missing from natural beauty, is fundamentally for itself. The subject does not overcome a real distinction between thought and nature, but merely encounters a movement within a self-affirming, self-referential structure. Fredric Jameson shares this reading of Hegel’s dialectic and notes the way in which all interactions ultimately become self-referential and that which is ‘not-I’ remains non-existent. Such a relationship with nature ‘is the knowledge of oneself in the externalization of oneself; the being that is the movement of retaining its self-identity in its otherness.’ For Adorno, Hegel extinguishes natural beauty because, firstly, the freedom that self-consciousness grants to itself is treated as the only thing worthy of attention, and secondly, the model of self-consciousness posited by Hegel ultimately renders immediacy as such impossible thus condemning the world to be forever for the subject.
Adorno counters Hegel by equating natural beauty with the non-identical. As Deborah Cook has pointed out, commentators on Adorno often conflate ‘nature’ and ‘natural beauty.’ Jay Bernstein and Hent de Vries, for example, have made the claim that Adorno equates nature with non-identity. Non-identity, as the irreducible particularity of an object, extends to both natural objects and cultural objects. When Adorno speaks of the non-identical he is referring to natural beauty. And natural beauty qua non-identity flashes up in our encounter with both cultural objects and natural objects because these encounters are always mediated. This relationship between the mediation of natural objects and the mediation of cultural objects underpins why Adorno claims that Hegel missed the extent to which art and nature dialectically inform each other. When we encounter nature, we never encounter pure nature. An encounter with nature produces the same distance that separates a work of art from the viewer. This distance, and here Hegel and Adorno agree, cannot be overcome through the application of physics or rationality. But rather than following Hegel in a move towards the Notion, Adorno maintains that mediation is so deeply embedded in all of our experiences, perceptions, and feelings that the task of disentangling nature from what thought imposes upon nature is ultimately impossible. Where Hegel seeks total reconciliation, Adorno seeks to maintain difference without domination. The subject interacts with the world in a way that respects the non-identity of objects. Natural beauty points towards something else, something beyond the immediacy of the object. To be even more precise, natural beauty points towards a nature that could be more than what it is.
To make the claim that natural beauty expresses a nature that could be more implies that nature expresses a deficiency of some kind. Natural beauty, Adorno argues, expresses suffering. By arguing that non-identity is that which remains unknowable while also arguing that natural beauty expresses suffering, Adorno appears to be contradicting himself. Although Adorno never explicitly dealt with this contradiction, Alison Cook has brilliantly extrapolated an explanation from Herbert Marcuse’s essay The Concept of Essence. Marcuse argues that we do not need to know fully what capacities humans might have if we are to make a claim about human suffering and misery. From the experience of oppression, we can infer negatively the existence of human capacities that have been suppressed, even if we cannot provide explicit examples. If we apply this logic to Adorno’s argument on natural beauty and suffering, we can see that the suffering of nature is expressed negatively.
We cannot provide positive examples of nature developing spontaneously to guide our understanding of the way in which nature suffers, not because they might be inaccurate, but because pure nature does not exist. The weed that sprouts from the cracks in the road tell us no more about pure nature than the tar that furnishes its base; both are effects of the domination of nature by Man. The most that we can decipher about nature’s suffering from our encounter with natural beauty is simply that nature endures suffering. The tragedy of this expression is found in the historical emergence of natural beauty. Adorno argues that natural beauty could only emerge once nature had lost its threatening powers. Only when people secured their means of sustenance, through agriculture or technological development, could they stop to admire the beauty of what once threatened their very existence. For Adorno, the prerequisite for natural beauty is the domination of nature. The non-identity of nature can only express suffering because suffering is all it knows, and perhaps all it can know.
It is here that the dialectical relationship between art and nature comes back into Adorno’s thinking. Natural beauty, as a moment, encompasses three elements that occur simultaneously: the encounter with non-identity as the purely unknowable; non-identity as suffering; and the recognition that by pointing towards a ‘more than’, natural beauty also expresses a kind of hope that a reconciled nature is possible. But, the power of this third element gets cancelled out if we turn towards nature itself in our hope for reconciliation because we demand that nature says more than it can, more than the simple fact that it suffers. In the face of nature’s suffering, the task of art should be to lend a voice to that suffering. Only in art can natural beauty be expressed in such a way that does not inadvertently reproduce the conditions that give rise to nature’s suffering. Art does this by expressing the more that natural beauty points towards. Landscape paintings that depict nature as harmonious grab at the appearance of nature in the same way that a pick-axe wrenches minerals from the earth. In the inescapably antagonistic world of modern capitalism, art that depicts nature as harmonious and coherent kills natural beauty, as does the turn towards nature in order to embrace natural beauty. The more of natural beauty that art devotes itself to is the anticipation of a being-in-itself that does not yet exist. Art hints towards reconciliation without expressing it directly. For Adorno then, natural beauty, as that which expresses nature’s suffering, and its realisation can only be found in art.
A Return to Hegel
Despite his insistence on thoroughly subjecting all concepts to the power of the dialectic, Adorno depicts a kind of romantic-dystopian image of natural beauty by positing conceptual thinking against nature. The problem in Adorno’s reading of Hegel is his disavowal of the Notion. As mentioned earlier, Adorno reads Hegel’s philosophy as ‘belly turned mind.’ I think that here Adorno reveals the idealism of his philosophy. In his attempt to counter the subjective domination that he detects in Hegel’s dialectic, Adorno reasserts the subject’s dominant power. What Adorno calls belly turned mind is ironically a projection of Adorno’s own suspicion of conceptual thinking onto the Notion. The consumption metaphor reveals that Adorno can only see half of the process of sublation that leads to the Notion, and as a result, misses what Slavoj Žižek playfully terms the ‘defecation.’ Negative dialectics inadvertently pre-supposes a kind of consistency to the object and, more importantly, a kind of permanence to thinking as such. Adorno’s commitment to non-identity as a remedy to ‘belly turned mind’ pushes cognition into a transcendent realm because conceptual thinking itself does not undergo sublation, whereas the Notion sublates thinking as such in its final move to release the object back into itself. An Adornian reading of the Notion registers only the assertion of the ‘actuality’ of an object.
I think a better reading of the Notion is what Adorno pushes into non-identity, namely the ‘potentiality’ of an object. The Notion is the recognition of the potentiality for redemption of historical failures of an object mediated through the subject. As Marx made clear through his analysis of commodity fetishism, abstractions are real, they make up reality as such. The tension between subject and object, between Man and nature, is a part of reality rather than an imposition. The Notion allows for the repetition and re-emergence of an object’s potential located in the desire of the subject. The Notion of nature does not present an image of nature and then force nature to conform. The Notion of nature expresses what nature could be beyond conceptual determination because the Notion is also the recognition that contradictions and inconsistencies exist beyond mere thought. It is a revelation that nature itself is also inconsistent and contradictory. By placing contradiction as a category of subjective understanding Adorno forges an irrevocable split between subject and object, or more specifically, places the subject above the object. The subject is forever doomed to dominate nature in its attempt to find reconciliation. The Notion, though, does not ignore the contradictions found in the object itself. Through the assertion of a potentiality, the Notion abstracts a unifying form from the plethora of particularities that render two objects to be different while simultaneously allowing those particularities their own spontaneous movement.
What does this mean in concrete terms for our understanding of nature? The formulation of non-identity on Adorno’s terms positions the relationship between Man and nature as one in which nature is a passive victim and Man is the great destroyer. Any interaction between the two will be a relationship of domination with a lingering more that expresses nature’s suffering. But if we take the Notion of nature as defined above the situation is becomes less hopeless. For example, take the claim made by Hegel that man ‘uses nature as a means of defeating nature.’ In regard to the practical relationship with nature, the deficiency is clear; nature is merely an instrument for sustaining Man against the dangers that nature poses. But through the Notion such a claim shows that using nature to defeat nature might mean defeating the catastrophic tendencies of nature. And despite Adorno’s suspicion of self-consciousness, the emergence of the Notion of nature would show that the presence of self-consciousness in nature is essential it its own self-movement. Rewilding is one example of a relationship with nature that realises the Notion of nature as described above. Rewilding is not a hands-off approach where Man takes a step back as a passive observer, and it is also not the strict management of what nature is forced to be.
Rewilding re-establishes the foundations to the habitats lost to prior management and agriculture. Once the foundations are laid, nature is left to develop on its own terms. Rewilding does not reverse the damage caused by human activity but re-establishes habitats where their loss causes catastrophes. Of course, there remains traces of the activity of self-consciousness in the fact that habitats are introduced by Man, but I think that these traces are representative of what Hegel refers to when he claims that self-consciousness, as an object, is released back into nature as nature. The subject does not manipulate nature strictly for self-sufficiency but releases part of self-consciousness from itself to ensure the existence of what Jameson refers to as the ‘not-I’. The subject does not have to know fully what nature will look like after rewilding, and in this way the subject remains faithful to the ‘not-I’ without ever needing a direct encounter. Through the activity of letting go, through an active passivity, the subject grants nature the freedom of self-movement. Of course, rewilding is only one example, and, if rewilding does not continue to allow nature its self-movement, it will become just another form of management and domination.
Where does this leave natural beauty? Adorno accuses Hegel of turning away from natural beauty because it lacks self-consciousness. But if we read Hegel closely we can see how problematic Adorno’s reading is. Beginning with inanimate nature, such as rocks and dirt, Hegel moves towards more complex nature, such as animals. Along the way he does not discard each element as inferior or unworthy of attention. An animal, for example, is a multitude of individual, less complex parts working together to sustain a complex being. The heart is nothing without the animal, and the animal is nothing without the heart. Hegel maintains his appreciation of natural beauty but points out the lack of self-consciousness. Between the practical relationship and physics, the products of Man stand alien and hostile to nature. Buildings stand apart from nature as the manifestation of Man’s attempt to use nature against itself in his self-preservation. As made clear earlier, animals cannot go beyond a freedom delimited by the drive for self-preservation, so the objects made by man found in nature remain at the level of the animal.
Hegel’s turn away from nature to art is not a final turn, but one of historical necessity. Nature remains separate and its beauty as pure appearance remains for the subject as a separate entity. Through the Notion described above, self-consciousness would also see itself in nature. The traces of self-consciousness released back into nature to ensure its spontaneous self-movement would be there as nature. Natural beauty would not sit behind the superior Beauty of works of art but would re-emerge through the potentiality immanent to the Notion of nature. The way that artists can let their materials speak for themselves, as Adorno so praised Beethoven and Schoenberg, the way that self-consciousness can express freedom through art, is a relationship that is not strictly confined to art. Natural beauty would flash up through the spontaneous self-movement granted to nature through the Notion. Natural beauty, rather than remain an expression of suffering fully realised only through art, rather than remain forever incomplete due to the absence of self-consciousness, would be the appearance of self-consciousness as nature to itself.
By examining Adorno’s critique of Hegel in relation to nature, I showed how Adorno’s project missed the subversive potential of Hegel’s thinking. By missing the sublation of sublation that was already contained within the Notion, Adorno’s remedy, the commitment to non-identity, actually undermined his own project. Hegel’s claims on natural beauty need to be read as historically specific claims. If we contemporise Hegel’s dialectic and his reading of nature in relation to self-consciousness we can show how self-consciousness can release itself back into nature as nature. This line of thought requires much more work in order to show in detail the differences between negative dialectics and the Hegelian dialectic in relation to natural beauty, but what I have shown is a reading of Hegel and Adorno that insists on a reconsideration of the relationship between natural beauty and artistic beauty. If, as Adorno claims, reflection on natural beauty is irrevocably requisite to the theory of art, this essay proposes that the structure of art practices and aesthetic considerations should not be kept separate from our thinking on nature. The spontaneity and freedom, the celebration of human creativity, the purposelessness of art, can provide us with the coordinates for new ecological thinking and new approaches to art practices that do not rely on traditional categories that keep the two separated.
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 Theodor W. Adorno, Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, Aesthetic Theory (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 62.
 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, Volume 1 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), p. 194.
 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, p. 195.
 Ibid., p. 196.
 Ibid., p. 197.
 Ibid., p. 198.
 Ibid., p. 195.
 Glenn Alexander Magee, The Hegel Dictionary (London: Continuum, 2010), p. 58.
 Ibid., pp. 157-158.
 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, pp. 200-202.
 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, p. 203.
 Magee, pp. 59-60.
 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 111.
 Hegel, Aesthetics, p. 121.
 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, p. 195.
 Magee, p. 38.
 Rodolphe Gasché, ‘The Theory of Natural Beauty and Its Evil Star: Kant, Hegel, Adorno’, Research in Phenomenology, 32.1 (2002), p. 115.
 Hegel, Aesthetics, p. 116.
 Ibid., p. 134.
 Hegel, Aesthetics, p. 138.
 Ibid., p. 140.
 Ibid., p. 145.
 Gasché, p. 115.
 James Phillips, ‘Hegel and Heidegger on the Essence of Beauty: Plotting the Trajectory from Kant’s Third Critique’, Philosophy Today, 59.1 (2015), p. 25.
 Hegel, Aesthetics, p. 132.
 Günter Figal, ‘Natural Beauty and the ‘Representative Character of the Work of Art’, in Theodor W. Adorno: Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory Volume IV, ed. by Simon Jarvis (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 73.
 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 74.
 Theodor W. Adorno and E. B. Ashton, Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge, 1973), pp. 22-24.
 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 74.
 Figal, p. 75.
 Ibid., p. 74.
 Fredric Jameson, The Hegel Variations: On the Phenomenology of Spirit (London: Verson, 2010), p. 131.
 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 459.
 Deborah Cook, Adorno on Nature, (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 167
 Cook, p. 43.
 Camilla Flodin, ‘Of Mice and Men: Adorno on Art and the Suffering of Animals,’ Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, 48.2 (2011), p. 145; Peter Uwe Hohendahl, ‘Integration and Critique: The Presence of Hegel in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory’, Telos, 174 (2016), p. 49.
 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 65.
 Flodin, p. 148.
 Alison Stone, ‘Adorno and the disenchantment of nature’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 32.2 (2006), p.245.
 Flodin, p. 146.
 Ibid., p. 147; Stone, p. 245.
 Ibid., p. 246.
 Hohendahl, p. 49.
 Stone, p. 247.
 Flodin, p. 149.
 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 77.
 Slavoj Žižek, Less than Nothing, (London: Verso, 2012), p. 333.
 Ibid., p. 398.
 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of the Political Economy, Volume One, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 163.
 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, (London: Verso, 2008), pp. 88-90.
 Žižek, Less than Nothing, p. 365.
 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, p. 196.
 Silvia Ceaușu et al., ‘Mapping opportunities and challenges for rewilding in Europe’, Conservation Biology, 29.4 (2015), p. 68.
 Jameson, The Hegel Variations, p. 131.
 Hohendahl, p. 50-51.
 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, p. 145.